DealStore · ROI for Ram
Three layers, each paid for by the one before it: stop paying Shopify on your 78 stores, sell DealStore to outside merchants, then scale toward 46,000 stores. Money is released in gates, so the loss is capped if any gate fails.
Build investment
$0.5M
Remaining ask, 25% discounted rates
Annual saving (ESTIMATE)
$1.5M
Cash only, checkable on invoices
Payback on savings alone
0.3 yrs
Zero outside merchants. 0.5 yrs if full scope were charged from zero
Base case, Year 5 benefit
$7.7M
22,000 external stores
We already push products to Google and get customers that way. What is special about DealGuaranty?
Nothing replaces Google, and we should not pretend it does. Google is rented traffic: free listings help, but volume costs ad clicks every month and the shopper has no price protection. DealGuaranty is one more channel on the same catalog, switched on with one button, with price-guarantee and escrow-backed buying that Google does not offer. It costs a click and a 2.5% commission only when it sells.
Proof: 60-day tagged test on 200 products. If it does not bring real orders, we drop it and it stays out of every number.
Why should anyone treat DealGuaranty as bigger than Google for supply and customers?
They should not. Google is far bigger for reach, and DealGuaranty is not counted in the base case or the payback. The ROI stands without it. It is upside that Ram can verify or discard after 60 days.
Proof: marketplace figures appear only as upside rows, never in the base totals.
Why would any merchant leave what Shopify already provides and come to DealStore?
Most will not leave for features alone, so the plan does not depend on that. Step 1 needs no persuading: your own 78 stores. Moving them stops a Shopify bill you can read off your invoices, and the payment margin and customer data stay with you. Step 2 targets merchants already paying high Shopify fees, with an import tool that copies the catalog, so switching costs them days, not months. Step 3 (scale toward 1%) only gets funded if step 2 shows paying stores.
Proof: Shopify invoices stop after cutover (week 11 onward); 10 design partners paying; gate checks before more money is spent.
DealStore has no value addition. All they want is something extra.
Fair challenge. Today the honest position is parity first: 168 of 295 PRD requirements are covered and 45 must-haves are still open, and we say so. What Shopify does not give a merchant, and DealStore already has, is the back office on the same stack: ERP and ledger, CRM, BI, campaign tools and the marketplace button. Merchants pay for that today through a $400 a month app stack and separate accounting software. The pitch is the same storefront for less money plus the back office, not a nicer theme.
Proof: Coverage Verdict and Requirement Tracker sheets list every open gap; the app-stack saving is read from the pasted invoices.
How do we know you are not just selling a dream?
Because the plan can fail cheaply. Money is released in gates. Gate 1 (week 12) needs a live store with checkout conversion within 5% of Shopify. Gate 3 needs the savings visible on invoices. Gate 4 needs 300 paying outside stores. If a gate fails, spending stops and the loss is capped at that point.
Proof: Stage Gates sheet shows cumulative money at risk per gate.
Savings are ESTIMATES until real Shopify invoices are pasted
One row per store: store, Shopify plan, apps, third-party gateway surcharge (only the extra, not normal card fees), other fees. Paste from Excel or CSV. Plan and apps are read as monthly, gateway and other as annual, unless the header says annual or monthly.
| App Ram's stores pay for | DealStore uses instead | Status | Paid / store / month ($) | DealStore cost / store / month ($) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Search and filtering | Built-in Meilisearch search | |||
| Product reviews | DealStore review sync and storage | |||
| Order tracking and shipment notices | Built-in tracking sync, email and SMS | |||
| Abandoned cart and email | Built-in cart recovery and Resend email | |||
| Shipping rates and labels | EasyPost, one negotiated rate for all stores | |||
| Sales tax | TaxJar, pooled across stores | |||
| Inventory sync / multi-store | One shared inventory | |||
| ERP / accounting connector | DGERP and DealStore posting, no connector | |||
| Net saving from apps and APIs replaced (78 stores) | Enter invoice amounts | |||
Nothing is assumed: amounts start empty and only count once you type what Ram's invoices show. Saving = (paid minus DealStore cost) x 12 x 78 stores. "Replaced" counts in full, "Partly replaced" counts half, "Kept" counts zero. DealStore cost includes the usage fees of EasyPost, TaxJar, Meilisearch, Twilio and Resend. Entries are saved in this browser only and are not yet added to the savings figure above, so nothing is counted twice.
| Migration wave | Stores | Cutover week | Annual saving unlocked |
|---|---|---|---|
| EspeciallyYours | 1 | 11 | $19,105 |
| Wave 1 (LabelShoppers 1-10) | 10 | 17 | $191,054 |
| Wave 2 (11-30) | 20 | 20 | $382,108 |
| Wave 3 (31-50) | 20 | 22 | $382,108 |
| Wave 4 (51-77) | 27 | 24 | $515,845 |
Savings use estimated Shopify plan, app and gateway costs. Paste real invoices above to replace them.
| Full year, all 78 stores live | Amount | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| Shopify bills that stop after cutover | $1,562,220 | Plans + apps + gateway surcharge + connector fees, less app replacement cost |
| DealStore fee charged to Ram's stores (same price as outsiders) | -$285,944 | 78 stores x $79/month + 0.4% of $53,000,000 sales |
| Ram net saving per year | $1,276,276 | Shown to Ram as saved vs Shopify, after paying the fee |
| DealStore run cost for the 78 stores | -$72,000 | Hosting and support |
| Profit kept by DG Holdings on Ram's stores | $213,944 | Fee less run cost |
Ram's stores are billed at the same price list and discounts as outside merchants, never more than the best outsider price. Year 1 is smaller because stores cut over in waves ($652,927 net saving to Ram in Year 1). Ram plus DG Holdings together still keep the same total as the Annual saving figure above.
| Five-year outcome | Conservative | Base (planning case) | Ram's Dream (1%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| External stores, Year 5 | 8,000 | 22,000 | 46,000 |
| Year 5 platform revenue | $5.4M | $19.9M | $59.6M |
| Year 5 operating profit (external) | $0.6M | $6.2M | $35.1M |
| Year 5 total benefit incl. savings | $2.1M | $7.7M | $36.6M |
| Peak cash Ram puts in | $0.1M | $0.3M | $0.2M |
| Payback year | Year 2 | Year 2 | Year 2 |
| Equity value Y5 (estimate) | $16.2M | $99.3M | $417.2M |
| Ram's share after dilution | $16.2M | $69.5M | $229.4M |
| Total spent over 5 years | $11.8M | $29.3M | $61.7M |
| Value back per $1 spent | 2.8x | 3.8x | 5.8x |
The 1% case needs about 1,208 new stores a month in Year 5 and earns $59.6M revenue, lower than Shopify-level revenue per store because DealStore keeps only the payment margin above cost. The Base case is the planning case; Conservative still repays the build.
| Number | Value | How it is built | Source | How to check it | Hardest challenge |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Annual saving on 78 stores | $1,490,220 | Shopify plans + apps + gateway surcharge + connector fees, less DealStore run cost | ESTIMATE. Replace with pasted invoices | Add the invoice lines up. The bill that stops after cutover IS the saving. | "Savings are invented." Answer: they are your own invoices; we only subtract the DealStore run cost. |
| Build investment | $496,571 | Work packages x role x hours x rate card (25% below industry), less work already built | Work Package Status sheet in the Defense Pack | Any package can be taken by Ram's team; the ask drops by that line exactly. | "Why not our developers?" Answer: fine for handover modules, nothing is bundled. |
| External revenue per store | $1,168 / yr (Base) | Subscription x 12 + GMV per store x payment margin | Our price list and Stripe Connect payout statements | First 10 design partners: compare real Stripe statements to this figure. | "Shopify makes $1,935 a store." Answer: we keep only the margin above payment cost, so we model lower on purpose. |
| Churn, acquisition cost, store growth | 12% / $300 / 22,000 stores (Base) | Judgement based on Shopify-refugee merchants and a self-serve import tool | ASSUMPTION, not yet measured | Measured monthly from Gate 3. Gate 4 releases growth money only if 300+ paying stores, churn under 15%, acquisition cost under $400. | "Growth is a guess." Answer: yes, so money for it is released only after real traction. |
| Equity value | $99,280,000 | Year 5 revenue x multiple (3x / 5x / 7x) | ESTIMATE of private-market pricing | Not counted in any cash payback or cumulative-cash figure. | "Valuation is hype." Answer: payback does not use it. |
| How DealStore earns | Who pays | Price | In base numbers? | Proof it works |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform subscription | External merchants | $79 / store / month (Base) | Yes | Stripe Billing subscription per store. Real money on the first design partner invoice. |
| Payment margin | Shoppers (inside card price) | 0.4% of store GMV above Stripe cost | Yes | Stripe Connect payout statement per store shows the kept margin. |
| Savings on Ram's 78 stores | Ram (stops paying Shopify) | See Captive Savings | Yes (Layer 1) | Shopify invoice stops after cutover; savings report built from invoices. |
| Marketplace commission | Merchants, on sales the channel brings | 2.5% of marketplace-attributed sales | No (upside only) | Orders tagged with the DealGuaranty source; commission = tagged sales x 2.5%. |
| Paid add-on modules (ERP, CRM, BI) | Merchants | Priced when 10 stores ask | No (not modelled) | Counted only after real purchase requests. |
Marketplace value (upside only, never in the base totals)
| Share of sales the marketplace brings | Extra sales on Ram's 78 stores | Extra profit at 35% margin | Commission earned from outside stores, Year 5 Base |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1% | $530,000 | $185,500 | $233,750 |
| 2% | $1,060,000 | $371,000 | $467,500 |
| 3% | $1,590,000 | $556,500 | $701,250 |
Commission 2.5%. On Ram's own stores it moves money between his companies, so only the extra profit counts.
One-button push to the DealGuaranty marketplace
Sends every active product of a store to the marketplace. Safe to press again: existing listings are refreshed, not duplicated.
Could not load stores: Request failed with status code 401
We are not better than Google at reach and we should not claim it. The same catalog goes to Google AND DealGuaranty. DealGuaranty adds what Google does not: price guarantee, buyer protection and deal-intent shoppers. Whether that earns real sales is proven by the 60-day test below, not by argument.
| Google Shopping (what Shopify pushes to) | DealGuaranty marketplace | Honest verdict | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reach | Billions of searches | Small, deal-hunting audience | Google wins. We do not claim otherwise. |
| Cost to merchant | Free listings; paid Shopping ads per click | No click fees; 2.5% only on a sale | Needs the 60-day test to prove. |
| Price trust | Shows a price, no guarantee | Price-guarantee checks, price history and alerts (built) | Differentiator; shopper adoption unproven. |
| Buyer protection | None from Google | Escrow-backed claims (built) | Differentiator. |
| Setup for the merchant | Shopify pushes products to Google automatically | DealStore: one button to DealGuaranty; Google Shopping feed exists for E2G, Google Merchant Center sync needs its account secrets added | Parity once Merchant Center is connected. |
| Repeat traffic | Shopper returns to search again | Alerts and saved deals bring shoppers back to the marketplace | Unproven; measured in the test. |
Pass only if: Plan, price and Ram inputs signed.
If it fails: Not signed: nothing spent.
Pass only if: Store runs on DealStore 14 days, zero data drift, checkout conversion within 5% of the Shopify baseline, Shopify cancelled.
If it fails: Parity or conversion fails: stop. Loss capped at Phase 1 + 2 spend.
Pass only if: All 10 stores live, savings visible on invoices, no revenue drop.
If it fails: Wave 1 fails: pause waves 2-4, fix, re-test. Spend so far is capped.
Pass only if: Verified annual saving at or above the Conservative case, 10 external merchants signed as design partners.
If it fails: Savings below plan: run the stores, do not fund external growth.
Pass only if: 300+ paying external stores, churn under 15%, acquisition cost under $400 per store.
If it fails: Traction below Conservative: hold at captive-only, which still pays back.
| What goes wrong | Y5 external profit | Peak cash | Payback |
|---|---|---|---|
| Base case as modelled | $6.2M | $0.3M | Year 2 |
| Every cutover slips 12 weeks | $6.2M | $0.6M | Year 2 |
| Real Shopify savings only 50% of estimate | $6.2M | $0.6M | Year 4 |
| External stores 50% lower | -$0.9M | $0.3M | Year 2 |
| External stores 75% of plan | $2.7M | $0.3M | Year 2 |
| External stores 125% of plan | $9.8M | $0.3M | Year 2 |
| Churn 20% (vs 12%) | $5.9M | $0.3M | Year 2 |
| Payment margin 0.2% (vs 0.4%) | $4.3M | $0.3M | Year 2 |
| Subscription $49 (vs $79) | $0.1M | $0.3M | Year 2 |
| Acquisition cost doubles ($600) | $2.8M | $0.4M | Year 2 |
| Fixed team cost 25% higher | $4.2M | $0.4M | Year 2 |
| No external merchants at all | $0.0M | $0.0M | Year 1 |
